BUSINESS LAW

Business Law 3

BUSINESSLAW

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PartOne

Conflictresolutionis an importantaspectof anywell-functioning labourmarketandindustrialrelationsystems.In alllabourrelations,there inevitablyexistslabourdisputeshencetheneedto resolvetheseconflictseffectivelyandefficiently forequitablebenefitsforallpartiesinvolvedin thedisputeandtheeconomyat large.TheUK has establishedandelaborateframeworkto dealwith alllabourdisputes,rangingfrom theformallitigationsto theinformalnegotiationsreferredto as thealternativedisputeresolution(ADR) strategies(Sime, Blake &amp Browne 2010).ADR strategiesare non-confrontational andcovera broadspectrumof approaches,rangingfrom party-to-party engagementin negotiations,arbitrationto adjudication. Among themostprevalentADR strategyusedin resolvingindustrialconflictsinclude mediations, arbitration and conciliation. In all theseprocesses, there is involvement of an impartial individual tofacilitate or recommend ways of resolvingconflicts.Theinvolvementof thenonpartisanthirdpartyhelpstheconflictingpartiesto finda mutuallyacceptableagreement,without resultingin litigation.ADR variesfrom low-level facilitation to high-level interventionpromotingfasterresolutionof disputeswithout resultingto litigations(Cownie, Bradney &amp Burton 2007).Thispaperexemplifiesthepurposeof ADR, with particularreferenceto Advisory, Conciliation andArbitration Service (Acas) in theUK. Further,thepaperexemplifiestheextentat which theABR are considereda successfulmeanof resolvingconflicts.

Acasis conciliation andarbitrationfunctionsetby theUK Government in 1974 to enhancetheusageof ADRs as alternative disputeresolutionstrategies.Since its inception,theAcas has assistedin mediating conflictsbetween partiesandindividuals,especiallyconflictsthat are collectivein nature.In its operation,Acasdistinguishesbetween thethree mostprevalentmodesof conflictresolutions,conciliation, arbitrationandmediation(ACAS 2005). Conciliation can beexplainedin termsof theindividualandcollectivedimensions that differentiateitfrom otherconciliatorymethods.Collectiveconciliationresolves conflictsbetween employersandtradeunionsoremployersanda groupof employeeswithout formalrepresentations.Conciliationservicesare offeredfollowingbreakdownof negotiationsandotherinternalconflictresolutionstrategieson issuesaffectingemployees(Baum 2011). Collectiveconciliation is voluntarywith requestscomingfrom eitherof thepartiesto theconflict.Conversely, individualconciliationis a statutoryserviceafter theemployeelodgesan ET1 applicationto theemploymentTribunal services,followinginfringementof individualemployeerights.Conciliation differsfrom contemporarymediationin thatconciliation can be conductedover thephone,unlike mediation,which has to beundertakenface-to-face. Theconciliator has to buildtrust,inform,facilitatecommentsandworkcloselywith partiesto theconflictto precipitateagreements(ACAS 2005).

Acasuses mediationmainlyforcollectivepurposesandis mostlyappliedin areaswhereconciliation has failed,andthepartiesto theconflictare unwillingto moveto bindingarbitration.Despite theinabilityto moveto abindingarbitration,partiesto theconflictmust remaincommittedto resolvingtheconflictswithout adoptingcoercive actionssuchas lockouts, strikesorlitigations.Acasmediationtakesthetraditionally acceptedcourse,wherenon-partisan mediatorsareusedto makebindingrecommendationsin attemptto resolvedisputes.Thepartiesmust takea carefulnoteof therecommendationsgivenby themediatorsince theyforma foundationforresolvingtheconflict.On theotherhand,arbitrationis moresimilarto mediation,with an impartialarbitratorselectedbyAcasto offerrecommendationsin an attemptto resolveconflictsbetween parties.Justlike mediators,Acasarbitratorsare selectedfrom a teamof an independentpanelof expert.Arbitratorsgivetheaptest,butnon-binding recommendationsto enda conflictbetween individualsorgroups(Sime, Blake &amp Browne 2010). Mediationdiffersfrom arbitrationin that,unlike therecommendationsfrom themediatorwhich are binding,therecommendationsfrom thearbitratorare not bindingtheymay be changedby eitherof thepartiesin theattemptto reachinga compromise.In addition,arbitrationtakesplacein a jointsession,unlike mediationwhich is moreflexible,mostlyinvolvingprivatesessionswith eachpartyto theconflict(Baum 2011).

InAcas,collectivearbitrationis morecommonthan collectivemediation,with thearbitratordeterminingthe‘finaloffer’,which is thefinalofferof one partyin contrastto thefinalofferof theotherparty.Therequirementthatthearbitratoris responsiblefordeterminingthe‘finaloffer’potentiallyjeopardisesarbitrator’simpartialityin theresolutionprocess(Sime,Blake &amp Browne 2010). Assuch,Acasarbitratorsare selectedfrom a panelof lawyersandjudges,with adequateskillsandexpertise in employmentlaws,thearbitrationprocess,andfavourableemploymentpractices.Arbitrationdiffersfrom adjudication in thatthepartiesto theconflictdiscloseallevidencesandare expectedto cooperatefullywith thearbitratorto resolvetheconflict.Thiseliminatescasesof one partysurprisingtheotherby introducingnewevidencesthat werenot knownby theotherparty(Baum2011). In recentyears,Acashas introducedindividualarbitrationschemeresolvingconflictssuchas casesof unfairdismissalfrom theworkplace orthepushforfavourableworkingconditions.In thesecases,Acasappointsexternalarbitratorsto offera bindingrecommendation,an alternative,speedyandnon-legalistic wayof resolvingworkplace conflict.Assuch,theADRs, reducesinstanceswhereworkplace progressto theindustrialcourtsandadverselyaffectingpartiesto theconflict(ACAS 2005). Inthe UK, theuseof ADR as alternativetolitigationgainedpopularityin 1990s, after thepublicationof an impetusforADRs,which requiredlitigantsandtheir legaladvisors to giveroomforADRs before resultingto litigations.Theirpopularitywaschampioned by theconcernthatthecourtsystemscausedelaysin hearingtribunalcases.Their applicationhas increasedover theyearsowingto thechanginglabourmarketandeconomiccycles.TheEmployment Act 2002 introducedsignificantchangesto useof ADRs in employmenttribunals,showingthegovernmentcommitmentsto createahighlyproductiveworkplaceenvironmentthrough fasterresolutionof disputes(Cownie, Bradney &amp Burton 2007).

Despitetheir hugeadoption,ADR programscannot be usedas a substituteto theformaljudicialsystem,butrathera complementaryinstrumentto achievingequity.However,theADR programshavesignificantadvantagesas comparedto theformaljudicialsystemshencetheir increasedadoption(Baum 2011). TheADR processis lessformaland has nowrittenlawsto formthecompromiseof thedispute,unlike formal litigations that use pre-written laws to resolveconflictsTheinformalityof theADRs ensuresthattherulesof proceduresare flexible,andappealsto theconflictingparties,especiallythosethat are intimidatedandcannot participatein theformaldisputeresolutionsystems.Theflexibilityof theADRs allowsthepartiesdiscussa compromisethat is beneficialto allparties.TheADRs facilitatestheaggrieved partyto participatein thecreationof arrangement,rulesandproceduresthat preventtheoccurrenceof such a disputein thefuture.Theinvolvementof allpartiesin theformulation of strategiesto preventthereoccurrence of similardisputesformsthekeyelementof ADR that is unavailable in theformaljudicialsystem(Ciarb 2014). Equallyimportant,ADRs promotetheapplicationofequity,ratherthan justtheruleof law.In ADR, eachdisputeis decidedby a thirdimpartialpartyorthrough negotiationsbetween thepartiesto theconflictfacilitatedby animpartialthirdparty.Thecompromiseisbasedon termsandprincipalsthat promoteequityamong theparties,ratherthan themaximsof theformaljusticesystems(Cownie,Bradney &amp Burton 2007).

Underthemaximsof theformaljudicialsystem,onepartyhas to winthecaseat theexpenseof theother,unlike in theADR programs,wheretheresolutionequatesbothparties.Thewin-lose resolutionstrategyof theformaljudicialsystemsarisesfrom thestrictadoptionof establishedjudicialprecedence,which in mostcasesfavorsone partyover theother(Sime, Blake &amp Browne 2010). On thecontrary,theADRs havenoprecedence,a factorthat promotestheachievementof efficientsettlementof disputesat theexpenseof consistentandformaljudicialsystems.In ADR programs,theresolutionsare based on availableevidences,above all,theneedto promotean equitablesolution.TheADRs offera fasterdisputeresolutionmeasures,differentiatingitfrom theformaljudicialsystem,wheredisputescan dragon foryearswithout reachingamicablesolutions.Thisincreasestheefficiencyof theADRs over theformaljudicialprocedures(Ciarb 2014). In addition,theADR promotesfinancialefficiencyof thepartiesto theconflictsince ittakesup lesserfinancialresourcesas comparedto theformallitigation.Duringformallitigation,thefinancialcostsof thelitigationare takenby thestate,whereasthefinancialcostsof theADRs are takenby thepartiesto theconflict,increasingfinancialefficiencyof ADR over formallitigation.Assuch,theUK Government considerstheADRs a cheaperconflictresolutionprocessthan theformallitigation((Baum2011). However,reducedcostsof ADRs over theformallitigationshould not be takenas theprincipalrationaleforpromotingtheADR programsover litigation.Thefinancialbenefitsshould betakenas theresultant benefitsof usingtheADRs. OthervaluesthatmaketheADR programsbetterconflictresolutionprocessesover theformaljudicialprocessesincludetheprogramsrespectforconfidentiality andpromotionof autonomyof theparties(Cownie, Bradney &amp Burton 2007).

ADRprogramsincreasespopularsatisfactionon resolutionsreachedin a disputereducesthecostsanddelaysin thedisputeresolutionprocesses.Above all,ADR increasesaccessto justiceby thedisadvantaged partiesandbypassestheineffectiveanddiscreditedcourtproceduresin theresolving disputes(ACAS2005). TheADR processesare interactive andeducative, allowingpartiesto a conflictto learnabout eachother’sinterests,promotesparticipationbetween thepartiesto controlthefinaloutcomesof their disputes.Thisis differentfrom theformaljudicialsystem,which has lessinteractionbetween thepartiesto a conflict,andthepartiesdonot participatein controllingtheoutcomeof theconflict(ACAS 2005).

Fromtheaforementioned,theADR programsare thenon-confrontational conflictresolutionstrategiesthat complement theformaljudicialsystems.Among theprogramsof ADR servicesprovidedby Acas includeconciliatory,arbitrationandmediationservices.Conciliation servicesare offeredfollowingthebreakdownof negotiationsstartedby internalorgansof thepartiesto a conflict.Conciliation is voluntaryandcan berequestedby anypartyto theconflict.Mediationmay be voluntaryorinvoluntaryconflictresolutionservicesofferedafter failureof conciliation. In thisprocess,an impartialthirdpartyoffersa bindingrecommendationthat formthebasisof thecompromise.On theotherhand,arbitrationinvolvesa thirddeterminingthe‘finaloffer’that s to be maintainedas thecompromiseto reachacompromise.TheAcas providestheimpartialthirdpartyto facilitatetheADR programsafter partyorstatutoryrequest,promotingfasterresolutionto a dispute.TheADRs providefasterconflictresolutionservicesat a lessercostcomparedto theformaljudicialsystems.Theypromotepartiesparticipationin theresolutionprocess,encouragingthem to controltheresolutionsrecommendations,sustainingparties,autonomy.Additionally, thepartiesto a conflictinteractto formpreventivestrategies,reducingpossibilitiesof reoccurrence of a conflict.TheADR processis moreefficientthan theformaljudicialsystems,savingtimeandfinancialresources,makingthem successfulmeansof resolvingdisputesoutside theformaljudicialprocess.

PartTwo

Inanyconstitution,thesupremacyclauseidentifiesthevariouslawsof theland,determiningthesupremelawsthat are to befollowedby thelegalsystemof thecountry.In manycountries,theparliamentarystatutesare supremeandtakeprecedenceover thecustomaryorreligiouslaws.Incaseof a conflictbetween thesupremeandotherlaws,thelatteris adoptedtheconflictinglawis repealedto conformto thesupremelaw(Jones 2013). In theUK, theEU lawsare supremeover thedomesticlawsenactedin theUK. Indecidinga casetheUK courtsystemsare supposedto ignorethedomesticlawsincaseof aconflictbetween theUK domesticlawsandtheEU laws,in which case,theUK lawsare repealedto conformto theEU laws(MacCulloch 2014).ThispaperexemplifiesthereasonswhytheEuropean Union lawstakeprecedenceover domesticlawsenactedin theUK oranyothermembercountryof theEU.

Priorto 1972, lawsin theUK wereenactedthrough actsof theparliament,which wasconsideredsovereignandsupremesourceof UK laws.Theparliamentwould alteranylawaffectingthepopulace,andthere wasnoinstitutionthat hadpowerto overridethesupremacyof theparliamentenactedlaws.Thesupremacyof theparliamentin enactingruleswasoverriddenwhentheUK joinedtheEuropean Union (EU) in 1973. After joiningtheEU, The UK Enacted theEuropean Communities Act 1972 which promotedthesupremacyof theEU lawsover theUK domesticlawsandrestricted thesupremacyof theparliamentin relationto substantive issues.Under theact,theEuropean Union lawswould takeprecedenceover domesticlawsenactedin theUK(MacCulloch2014).

TheUK incorporatedtheactin thedomesticlaws,allowingtheEU lawstakeprecedenceevenover theprimarylegislations.Two principlesectionsthat effecttheEuropean Community Act 1972 over theUK are sectiontwo (1) andSection two (4). Sectiontwo (1) of theEuropean Community Act 1972 statethat theUK must enforceallrightsthat resultfrom its relationswith theEU, whereasthesectiontwocapfour of theactstatesthattheEU lawsare supremeover theUK parliamentarystatutes.Thesupremacyof theEU lawsmeansthatanydomesticlawthat conflictsdirect,effectiveEU laws,thelattertakesprecedenceover theformer.Forinstance,in VanGend en Loos v Netherlands[1963], theEuropean courtof Justice statedthatanydomesticcourtthat conflictedtheEU lawshadto be assumed,with theEU lawstakingprecedence(Turpin &ampTomkins 2011).In addition,alldomesticlawsthat are foundto conflictwith theEU lawsare to be repealedtoabideby thesupremeEU to avoidfutureconflicts.Theprinciplesin Rv,Secretaryof State forTransport ex p Factortame Ltd[1991], werefoundto conflictwith theEU laws(MacCulloch 2014). TheHouse of Lords ruledtookprecedenceof theactsof parliamentandhadthepowerto ignoretheparliamentaryacts,in areasthat theyconflictedwith theEU laws.ThispromptedtheUK Government to amendthelegalprinciplesin thecase,abidingthem to EU laws.Further,sectionthree of theEuropean Communities Act 1972 statesthatanydomesticlawin anyof themembercountriesisregardedas a questionto be interpretedby European courtof justice(ECJ), orifin UK courts,in accordance with decisionsof ECJ (Jones 2013).

Fromtheaforementioned,theEU lawstakeprecedenceover thedomesticlawsin theUK, with thedomesticlawsrequiringrepealingto conformto theEU laws.Thesupremacyof theEU lawsover domesticlawsstartedin 1972 after theparliamentenactedtheEuropean Communities Act 1972. Priorto theact,theparliamentwasthesupremeinstitutionresponsibleforenactinglaws.Theparliamentwould repealandchangeanylawat its discretion,butthere wasnoinstitutionto changelawsenactedby theparliament.TheEuropean Communities Act 1972 statedthattheEU lawswould takeprecedenceover alldomesticlawsenactedin theUK. Under sectiontwo (1) andsectiontwo (4), theUK should implementtheEU lawsandrepealthedomesticlawsthat contradicttheEU laws.Under theact,thesupremacyof theparliamentwassignificantly reduced,makingtheEU lawstakeprecedenceover thedomesticlawsenactedin theUK.

ReferenceList

ACAS2005. Making more of Alternative Dispute Resolution. Retrieved fromhttp://www.acas.org.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=177&ampp=0

Baum,C 2011, The benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in CommonInterest Developments Disputes. Volume 84 (3). Retrieved fromhttp://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&ampcontext=lawreview

Blake,S. H., Browne, J., &amp Sime, S 2014, Apractical approach to alternative dispute resolution. OxfordUniversity Press: Oxford, United Kingdom

Ciarb2014, Adr,Arbitration, and Mediation A Collection of Essays.Authorhouse

Cownie,F., Bradney, A., &amp Burton, M 2007, Englishlegal system in context.Oxford Univ. Press: Oxford.

JONES,L 2013, Introductionto business law.Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press

Rodger,B. MacCulloch A 2014, CompetitionLaw and Policy in the EU and UK.Routledge: London

Sime,S., Blake, S. H., &amp Browne, J 2010, Apractical approach to alternative dispute resolution.Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Turpin,Colin, Tomkins, Adam 2011, BritishGovernment and the Constitution: Text and Materials.Cambridge University Press: Cambridge