Science Critique Putnam for Debunking Popper’s Falsification

SCIENCE 5

Putnam argues that falsification is not as simple as presented byPopper. He notes that if an experimental result differs from atheoretical prediction, it is not possible to conclude the errorexist in the premise. The argument is that it is not probable toderive conclusion from a mismatch amid hypothesis andexperimentation, that the theory is false. The error could arise fromdifferent reasons, identified or unidentified. For instance,mismatching may arise from experiment faults, errors in calculationsof the theory’s predictions, or auxiliary presumptions, which havebeen created. Additionally, facts used in experiments are theoryloaded. Thus, it is impossible to test theories in opposition to pureexperiment facts, free of a theory. The presumptions and situationsof testing theories may be so many, which makes falsifying a theory,rationally almost improbable.

The paper is an evaluation of Putnam’s critique on falsification.It demonstrates why Putnam argues that theories are impossible totest through falsification as proposed by Popper. The researchbriefly introduces falsification and demonstrates that there is nomanner of theory falsification via creating an observation, whichappears to disagree to a single assertion.

Annotated Bibliography

García,C. E. (2006).&nbspPopper`stheory of science: An apologia.London: Continuum.

Although the book’s title is onPopper’s theory, the author has also discussed critics againstPopper’s falsification. Garcia includes the critique made byPutnam. He notes that Putnam supposes that Popper fails to considerthe pragmatic vies of science. Putnam further refers to Popper’sargument as a scarce reference to pragmatism. This is because theconcept of falsification is a reduction of the use of scientifictheories to a different test of laws. Putnam asserts that Popper’sphilosophy is inadequate by making science practically irrelevant andunable of resulting in understanding of the globe.

Gupta, C. (2002).&nbspRealismversus Realism. Lanham:Rowman and Littlefield.

The source is a defense tointernal realism metaphysics, advocated by Hilary Putnam. Putnam is aphilosopher, who has as well made major philosophical contributions.Notably, is his writing as a critique on Popper’s falsification.The book enhances knowledge on the critics Putnam makes, as areaction to falsification. The critique is important in understandingPutnam’s counter-argument to Popper’s assumption. Anunderstanding of Putnam, likewise, makes it easier to reflect on bothphilosophers and make individual critique on Putnam. Becausephilosopher involves presenting and backing one’s ideas, Putnam’scritics are also questionable. The source will be helpful byproviding basic information to employ in the critique.

Norris, C. (2002).&nbspHilaryPutnam: Realism, reason and the uses of uncertainty.Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press.

The author expounds on thephilosophical arguments that have been made by Putnam. Norris placesthe work of Putnam within a larger philosophical framework, and linksit to several present arguments on philosophical science. Of theworks discussed is Putnam’s view of falsification. The book is animportant source in the research. It informs on the diversity in viewbetween Putnam and Popper concerning theories. The author explainsthe issues Putnam raises in reference to falsification. The issuesmake up the critique, which is a major contribution to the discussionin the research.

Putnam, H. (1991). The“corroboration” of theories.&nbspThephilosophy of science,6,121.

The source is an analysis of whyPutnam supposes that Popper’s theory is impractical. Putnampresents Popper’s view as misplaced in the scientific context. Heargues that when a philosopher presents a theory to others, it is tobe applied and not tested to validate its authenticity. Becauseapplying science laws does entail anticipating prospect successes,Putnam concludes that Popper is misplaced in arguing that inductionin unimportant.

References

García,C. E. (2006).&nbspPopper`stheory of science: An apologia.London: Continuum.

Gupta, C. (2002).&nbspRealismversus Realism. Lanham:Rowman and Littlefield.

Norris, C. (2002).&nbspHilaryPutnam: Realism, reason and the uses of uncertainty.Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press.

Putnam, H. (1991). The“corroboration” of theories.&nbspThephilosophy of science,6,121.